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I. Introduction
Few things are as ingrained in Americans’ daily lives as the Internet.
The Internet, a one-stop source for information, communication, and
entertainment, has supplanted the old media that came before it such as
books, telephones, fax machines, and television for many people. Yet the
Internet is an incredibly nebulous thing, a network of various private
networks the regulation of which is currently even more amorphous. A
recent decision of the D.C. Circuit, which has national effect, has rendered
the traditional model of the Internet subject to upheaval. The fundamental
principle in question, so-called “net neutrality,” stands for the idea that
Internet providers must treat all traffic equally. Blocking and preferential
treatment of certain Internet content providers (websites) was disallowed
under the now-vacated regulatory regime of the Federal Communications
Commission (“F.C.C.”)’s Open Internet Order. Now, however, Internet
providers are essentially free to force various services and websites like
Netflix and even Google to pay a fee if they want to be made available for
subscribers of the Internet provider’s service, a cost that is likely to be
passed on to consumers.
The purpose of this Article is to explore the reasoning behind the
holding in Verizon v. F.C.C. and examine whether the absence of net
neutrality or an open Internet is good public policy. Part II of the Article
provides a brief summary of the facts and holding of the case, followed by
an explanation of the legal background and context of the regulation in
question. Part III provides an in-depth analysis of the court’s reasoning and
how that reasoning differed between the majority and the dissent. Part IV
analyzes the court’s holding, first from a technical legal standpoint and
second from a public policy standpoint. The analysis invokes questions of
administrative statutory authority, the appropriate nexus of administrative
regulation and antitrust, whether the absence of mandated net neutrality is
good public policy in terms of potential anti- and pro-competitive effects,
and what the future may hold for the Internet. The Article takes the
position that the court’s decision was appropriate in its result for legal
reasons, yet nevertheless opens the door to potential market failures in the
future.
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II. Verizon v. F.C.C. Marks the End of an Era
Telecommunications behemoth Verizon Communications, Inc.
(“Verizon”) brought this petition for judicial review and notice of appeal of
the F.C.C.’s Open Internet Order of 20101 (“Order”).2 Verizon sought to
vacate the Order, which imposes anti-blocking, anti-discrimination, and
disclosure requirements on providers of broadband Internet service.3 The
Commission’s stated intent was to preserve the practice of “net
neutrality”4—referred to as “Internet openness” in the Commission’s
terminology—whereby broadband Internet service providers must treat all
information that passes over their networks equally without discriminating
or censoring based on source or content.5 Although heard before an
appellate court, this was a case in which the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit exercised its unique original jurisdiction and
authority of direct review over the orders and regulations of federal
independent agencies, and therefore there was no lower court disposition.6
Verizon challenged the Open Internet Order on multiple grounds, namely
that the Commission had exceeded its allotted statutory authority, that the
rules imposed were “arbitrary and capricious” because they were not
supported by substantial evidence, and, most significantly, that the Order
was in contravention of “statutory provisions [that] prohibit[ed] the
Commission from treating broadband providers as common carriers.”7
The court found that the Commission had established valid affirmative
authority to enact measures such as the one at bar encouraging the
deployment of broadband infrastructure.8 Moreover, the majority found the
Commission had reasonably interpreted Section 706 of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 as giving the Commission authority to
regulate how broadband providers treat Internet traffic. It also found that
the Commission’s justification for the rules, namely that they would
facilitate the continued innovation driving the explosive growth of the

1. In the Matter of Preserving the Open Internet Broadband Indus. Practices, 25 F.C.C.
Rcd. 17905 (2010).
2. Verizon v. F.C.C., 740 F.3d 623, 628 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
3. Id.
4. This term was coined by Columbia Law Professor Tim Wu and is the term most
commonly used by the media (and this Article) for the Commission’s concept of “internet
openness.” Jeff Sommer, Defending the Open Internet, N.Y. TIMES (May 10, 2014).
5. Verizon, 740 F.3d at 628.
6. See 47 U.S.C. § 402(a),(b) (2012) (delegating judicial review authority of F.C.C. orders
and decisions to the D.C. Circuit).
7. Verizon, 740 F.3d at 634.
8. Id. at 628.
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Internet, as similarly reasonable and “supported by substantial evidence.”9
However, even though the majority found that the Commission was
authorized to make these rules, the Order contravened one of the
Commission’s earlier rulings that expressly exempted information service
providers from treatment as common carriers.10 The authorizing statute
granted the Commission the authority to impose antidiscrimination rules on
only those providers that could be classified as common carriers, and
because the Commission had previously made the determination that
broadband Internet Service Providers (“ISPs”) were not common carriers
but instead were information service providers, the Commission was
estopped from nevertheless treating them as common carriers.11
Accordingly, the court vacated the antidiscrimination and anti-blocking
portions of the Open Internet Order.12

III. A History of the Internet and Its Regulation
Part III will provide the necessary background to understand the issues
and parties at hand in this dispute, including an overview of how the
intricate yet amorphous group of interrelated networks called the Internet
operates. It also looks at the level of deference normally given to
administrative interpretations of statutory authority, gives a brief history of
F.C.C. Internet regulation, and provides a detailed look at the Open Internet
Order being challenged.
A. The Internet Marketplace
Judge Tatel’s opinion in Verizon v. F.C.C. summarizes the parties
involved in the Internet as backbone networks, broadband providers (i.e.
those that provide the “last mile” network over which end users access
information, like Verizon or Comcast), edge providers (i.e. content
providers like Google or Facebook), and end users.13 Using what he admits
to be an oversimplified example, Judge Tatel describes the nexus of these
parties as such:

9. Id. Senior Circuit Judge Silberman wrote a separate opinion concurring in part and
dissenting in part that took issue with the supposedly substantial evidence the Commission put
forth purporting to show that such regulation was necessary to promote the development of
broadband and prevent a harmful market failure, dismissing the claims as “sheer speculation.” Id.
at 663 (Silberman, J., dissenting).
10. Id. at 628.
11. Id. at 655–56.
12. Id. at 628.
13. Id.
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when an edge provider such as YouTube transmits some sort of
content—say, a video of a cat—to an end user, that content is broken down
into packets of information, which are carried by the edge provider’s local
access provider to the backbone network, which transmits these packets to
the end user’s local access provider, which, in turn, transmits the
information to the end user, who then views and hopefully enjoys the cat.14
This example illustrates how the ISPs and backbone providers act as
intermediaries between end-user subscribers and content sources (felineoriented and otherwise). It is this relationship between broadband
providers and content providers that concerns advocates of net neutrality.
The standard by which Internet service can be considered “broadband”
has evolved over the years as technology has progressed.15 The 1996
Telecommunications Act defined broadband as Internet service furnished
with sufficient speed to enable users to “originate and receive high-quality
voice, data, graphics, and video telecommunications using any
technology.”16 In 1999, the Commission defined the minimum threshold
for meeting this requirement as 200 kilobytes per second (“kbps”)—fairly
slow by today’s standards.17 Shortly before implementing the Order in
2010, the Commission determined that 200 kbps was inadequate for the
modern needs of consumers, who often stream high-quality video while
also browsing the web.18 Accordingly, the Commission raised the
minimum threshold for broadband to four megabytes per second (“mbps”)
for downloads and one mbps for uploads.19
B. The APA and the Chevron Test of Administrative Deference
The disposition on whether a regulation is valid inevitably involves a
question of administrative deference. There are two separate but
overlapping authorities to which a court may look when determining
whether a federal agency’s regulation is a valid use of the agency’s
statutory authority: the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”)20 and the
test outlined by the Supreme Court in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural

14. Id. at 629.
15. Id. at 640.
16. 47 U.S.C. § 1302(d)(1) (2012).
17. Verizon, 740 F.3d at 640.
18. Id. at 640–41.
19. Id. This increased minimum threshold made the Order easier to justify because it
meant that a smaller percentage of Americans could be considered to have access to broadband.
See infra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
20. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2012).
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Defense Council, Inc.21 The APA instructs courts reviewing the validity of
regulations to determine whether the promulgating agency’s actions were
“arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law.”22 The Chevron inquiry involves asking whether
Congress has directly spoken on the precise issue and, if it has not or if the
statute is ambiguous, to determine whether the agency’s answer of that
question is a permissible construction of the statute.23
C. Jurisdiction and Regulations of the F.C.C.
The Communications Act of 1934 created the F.C.C. with the purpose
of executing and enforcing federal communications law and regulating
interstate communication without discrimination based on the traditionally
protected classes, among other considerations.24 The enacting legislation
states that the provisions of the chapter “shall apply to interstate and
foreign communication by wire or radio . . . and to all persons engaged
within the United States in such communication or such transmission by
radio.”25 Title II of the Communications Act also sets forth regulations for
any carrier or transmitter of communications that could be considered a
common carrier.26
Common carriers are defined somewhat circularly as “any person [or
entity] engaged as a common carrier for hire, in . . . communication by wire
or radio” except those expressly excluded and not including radio
broadcasters.27 Classification as a common carrier is accompanied by an
affirmative duty “to furnish such communication service upon reasonable
request therefor,” and also a requirement that “all charges, practices,
classifications, and regulations for and in connection with such
communications service . . . be just and reasonable.”28 In other words, a
telecommunications provider that the Commission deems to be a common
carrier may not discriminate between users of its service and must charge
reasonable prices. For example, a phone company given common carrier
status cannot refuse to complete the calls of some customers, but not
others; it must treat all phone traffic equally.
21. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
22. Verizon, 740 F.3d at 635 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012)).
23. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
24. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2012) (expressly providing protection from “discrimination on the
basis of race, color, religion, national origin, or sex”).
25. 47 U.S.C. § 152 (2012).
26. 47 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq. (2012).
27. 47 U.S.C. § 153(11) (2012).
28. 47 U.S.C. § 201 (2014).
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Although Congress undoubtedly did not contemplate the massively
complex system that is the modern World Wide Web when it enacted the
legislation in 1934, it seems clear that the Internet falls within the
Commission’s stated jurisdiction encompassing all “interstate and foreign
communications by wire or radio.”29 Indeed, since the Internet’s inception,
the Commission has promulgated regulations over the various players in
the Internet marketplace.30
One of the first such efforts to govern the Internet came in 1980, when
the Commission adopted what would be called the Computer II regime.31
The Computer II rules drew a distinction between “basic” and “enhanced”
services, with the former subject to common carrier regulation and the
latter given no such restrictions.32 Basic services were defined as those that
involved the pure or bare transmission of customer-supplied information
(e.g., telephone service), while enhanced services were defined as those
which involved computer processing applications for deciphering
transmitted applications.33 Thus, because connecting an end user to the
Internet clearly requires computer-processing applications, under the
Computer II regime, ISPs were providing “enhanced” services and were
not subject to regulation as common carriers.34
The next era of Internet regulation and classification began in the mid1990s with the enactment of the Telecommunications Act of 1996.35 The
1996 Act replaced the basic versus enhanced services distinction with a
parallel distinction between telecommunications carriers—equivalent to
basic carriers and subject to common carrier regulation—and informationservice providers equivalent to enhanced-service providers not subject to
common carrier regulation.36 Beyond merely altering the Commission’s
nomenclature, the 1996 Act also extended common carrier regulation to
Digital Subscriber Line (“DSL”) services, at least as to the transmission
facilities used.37
29. Verizon, 740 F.3d at 640 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 152(a)).
30. See id.
31. Id. at 629.
32. See In re Amend. of Sec. 64.702 of the Commission’s Rul. and Regs., 77 F.C.C. 2d 384,
387 ¶¶ 5–7 (1980) (“Second Computer Inquiry”).
33. Verizon, 740 F.3d 623 at 629-630 (citing Second Computer Inquiry, 77 F.C.C.2d at 420
¶¶ 96–97).
34. Id.
35. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
36. Verizon, 740 F.3d 623 at 630.
37. Id. DSL services furnish broadband over telephone wires. Id. at 630. DSL providers
could exempt their Internet access services from common carrier restrictions as being separate
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And yet, when the Commission was faced with the equivalent
question of whether cable broadband providers could be considered
information service providers four years later, it found in the affirmative.38
This was true even where cable providers operated the “last-mile”
transmission facilities, because the Commission reasoned that the cable
companies were providing “single, integrated information service[s].”39
This finding, ostensibly incongruent from the Commission’s classification
of DSL providers, completely exempted cable broadband operators from
common carrier regulation.40 The Commission later harmonized treatment
of all broadband providers however, declaring them to be information
services not subject to common carrier regulations.41 Even so, the
Commission maintained it had the right to intervene with broadband
providers’ network management even in the absence of common carrier
status if it saw ISPs violating the Commission’s stated intention of
preserving and promoting the “open and interconnected nature of the public
Internet.”42
In 2008, the Commission exercised this power in the form of an order
dictating bandwidth management practices and disclosure to cable
broadband provider Comcast after several of the company’s subscribers
complained that Comcast was interfering with customer’s ability to use
certain peer-to-peer networking applications such as BitTorrent.43 While
the Commission claimed to be invoking the “ancillary jurisdiction”
afforded to it to execute the functions of the Communications Act, the D.C.
Circuit Court rejected this justification, finding that the Commission had
failed to identify any “grant of statutory authority to which the Comcast
Order was reasonably ancillary.”44 Accordingly, the Commission’s order

from the transmission facilities themselves if and only if they operated them through a separate
affiliate or quasi-independent ISP. Id. at 631.
38. Id.
39. Id.; see also In Re Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to Internet over Cable &
Other Facilities, 17 F.C.C. Rcd. 4798, 4824 ¶ 41 (2002). This apparent inconsistency in treatment
between DSL and cable broadband providers was challenged before the Supreme Court in 2005,
and the Court upheld the classification, reasoning that the Commission was entitled to deference
in its interpretation of an ambiguous statute. Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet
Serv., 545 U.S. 967, 981 (2005); see also 47 U.S.C. § 153(53) (2012).
40. Verizon, 740 F.3d 623 at 631.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 631–32 (quoting In re Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the
Internet Over Wireline Facilities, 20 F.C.C.R. 14986, 14988 ¶ 4 (2005)).
43. Id. at 632 (citing In re Formal Complaint of Free Press and Public Knowledge Against
Comcast Corp. for Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, 23 F.C.C.R. 13028 (2008)).
44. Comcast Corp. v. F.C.C., 600 F.3d 642, 661 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
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was vacated.45 It was in the wake of this defeat that the Commission
adopted the Open Internet Order that became the subject of Verizon’s
challenge.
D. The Open Internet Order
The Open Internet Order, adopted in 2010, set forth various
prophylactic rules on broadband providers for the stated purpose of
“incorporat[ing] longstanding openness principles that are generally in line
with current practices.”46 Some of the requirements applied to both fixed
broadband providers (traditional DSL and cable broadband employing
fixed endpoints and stationary equipment) and mobile broadband (e.g., 4G
Internet service for smartphones), while some applied only to fixed ISPs.47
The requirements were threefold: public disclosure and transparency
mandates for both types of providers, anti-blocking proscriptions on both
types of providers, and anti-discrimination prohibitions on fixed providers
only.48
The disclosure requirements assured that the public would have access
to information regarding network management practices, performance, and
commercial terms of the company’s Internet service.49 The anti-blocking
requirements prevented broadband providers from blocking lawful
applications and content—or content that competes with the broadband
provider’s other services—subject to “reasonable network management.”50
Lastly, the antidiscrimination requirements imposed on fixed broadband
ISP’s, but not mobile operators, forbade unreasonable discrimination in
transmitting lawful Internet traffic.51
The Commission averred that it had authority to make these
regulations by citing a provision of the 1996 Telecommunications Act that
directed the Commission to encourage the deployment of broadband.52
With what Verizon characterized as a “triple cushion shot,”53 the
45. Id.
46. 25 F.C.C.R. at 17907 ¶ 4.
47. Verizon, 740 F.3d 623 at 633.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. (explaining that “reasonable network management” is defined as “practices designed
to ensure network security and integrity, address traffic that is unwanted by end users, and reduce
or mitigate the effects of congestion on the network”).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 634; see also 47 U.S.C. § 1302(a), (b) (2014).
53. Id. at 659. The “triple cushion shot” metaphor refers to a particularly convoluted trick
shot in billiards whereby the cue ball rebounds off three different cushions before hitting its
target.
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Commission reasoned that net neutrality would spur investment among
content providers, which in turn would lead to increased demand for
broadband, thus encouraging increased investment in broadband
infrastructure and ultimately leading to further innovation by content
providers.54 The Commission feared that a lack of regulation would allow
broadband providers to disrupt this “virtuous cycle of innovation” by
preventing end users from accessing all content providers and vice versa,
thus stifling the content provider’s ability to innovate.55 Compelling as this
question of public policy is, it was largely sidestepped by the majority in
Verizon.56

IV. The Reasoning Behind the Verizon v. F.C.C. Decision
The court averred that its task was not to assess the wisdom of the
rules, but rather to assess whether the Commission could demonstrate “that
the regulations fall within the scope of its statutory grant of authority.”57
The court organized its opinion to first address Verizon’s argument that the
Commission lacked affirmative statutory authority to assert the Open
Internet Order and further that the rules were arbitrary and capricious.58
Next, the court turned to Verizon’s argument that, by treating a type of
service provider the Commission had previously determined not to be a
common carrier as a common carrier, the Commission contravened a
statutory mandate.59 Finally, in a concurrence in judgment and dissent in
part, Judge Silberman detailed the authority inquiry within an antitrust
framework.60
A. A Question of Statutory Authority
In dismissing Verizon’s argument that the Commission lacked
statutory authority to promulgate the regulations, the court looked to
Section 706 of the 1996 Telecommunications Act, which provides that the
Commission should encourage the deployment of advanced
telecommunications capability (i.e., broadband) to all Americans and use

54. Id. at 634.
55. Id. at 644–50. Whether this fear was justified remains to be seen; two of the F.C.C.’s
commissioners even dissented to the imposition of the Order based in part on the belief that the
regulations might actually stifle innovation rather than encourage it. Id. at 634.
56. Id. at 628–59.
57. Id. at 634–35.
58. Id. at 635.
59. Id. at 649.
60. See id. at 659.
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regulating methods that remove barriers to investment.61 This section
further provides that if the Commission finds broadband is not being
deployed to all Americans in a reasonable and timely manner, it may take
immediate action to accelerate deployment by removing barriers to
infrastructure investment and promoting competition.62 Verizon contended
that these provisions of the 1996 Act should be considered mere
congressional statements of policy and, alternatively, that even if the
provisions did grant the Commission authority, the particular regulations
were not reasonable.63
In determining whether the Order fell within the Commission’s
jurisdiction, the court looked to both the APA64 and the test outlined by the
Supreme Court in Chevron65 governing the deference given to federal
agencies when they interpret an ambiguous statutory provision.66 The court
observed that if the Commission’s interpretation of the statute represented a
reasonable resolution of statutory ambiguity, then under Chevron the court
must defer to that interpretation, even if that interpretation involves an
agency determining the scope of its own jurisdiction.67
The court next discussed Verizon’s contention that the Order
represented an unreasonable departure from prior policy, and in doing so
discussed the Advanced Services Order, which was vacated by the court in
the earlier Comcast decision.68 Under the APA, an administrative agency
normally must acknowledge and advance reasons for a change in policy.69
Nonetheless, the court found it had no reason to find that the Commission
had ignored its prior interpretation of the relevant statute or had failed to
provide a reasoned explanation for its changed interpretation.70 As prior
cases had observed,71 a new interpretation of a statute that is contrary to an
agency’s initial interpretation cannot be rejected simply because it is new.72
Instead of dwelling on past interpretations, the court chose to focus on
whether the Commission’s current interpretation of Section 706(a) as a

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

47 U.S.C. § 1302(a) (2012).
Verizon, 740 F.3d 623 at 635; 47 U.S.C. § 1302(d)(1) (2012).
Verizon, 740 F.3d 623 at 635.
5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2012).
Chevron, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
Verizon, 740 F.3d 623 at 636.
Id. at 635.
Id. at 636.
Id. (citing F.C.C. v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009)).
Id. at 636–37.
See, e.g., Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Serv., 545 U.S. 697 (2005).
Verizon, 740 F.3d at 636.
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grant regulatory authority was reasonable and answered in the affirmative
that it was.73
The Act’s language, encouraging the deployment of broadband and
removal of barriers to infrastructure investment, could easily be interpreted
as a mere congressional statement of policy as Verizon suggested, but
could just as easily be read to grant the Commission actual authority.74 In
finding the Commission’s interpretation reasonable, the court observed that
the 1996 Act was passed against the backdrop of the Commission’s long
history of subjecting ISPs to common carrier regulation.75 Likewise, the
court found it had no reason to believe from the legislative history that
Congress would not have delegated such decisions to the Commission.76
While recognizing that Congress would likely not have intended to grant
the Commission limitless authority, the court nevertheless concluded that
the requirement that the provisions be proven to fulfill a specific statutory
goal was a sufficient limitation.77
The court next turned to the question whether Section 706(b) of the
Act granted the Commission authority to take action.78 Deferring to the
Commission’s interpretation, the court found that it did.79 In a departure
from its previous conclusions, the Commission made the necessary
determination that broadband was not being deployed to all Americans in a
reasonable and timely manner in 2010.80
The catalyst for this
determination, however, was sparked by the Commission’s own decision to
raise the minimum threshold for what constitutes “broadband.”81 Although
the court recognized the timing of this raised threshold and subsequent
determination that broadband was not reaching enough Americans was
“suspicious,” the timing alone did not render it unreasonable or arbitrary.82
Once this determination had been made, it was not unreasonable, in the
court’s view, for the Commission to exercise its apparent authority under

73. Id. at 637.
74. Id. at 637–38.
75. Id. at 638.
76. Id. at 639.
77. Id. at 640.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. Section 706(b) requires the Commission to find that “broadband deployment to all
Americans is not reasonable and timely” as a prerequisite to invoking the section’s grant of
authority to take immediate action to accelerate the deployment of broadband. Id.
81. Id. at 641. See also supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
82. Id. at 642.
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Section 706(b).83 In a related query, the court similarly rejected Verizon’s
alternative theory that, even if the Commission did have authority, the
specific rules exceeded that authority’s scope.84
The court further discussed how broadband providers have both the
incentive and the means to discriminate between content providers.85 The
court agreed with the Commission’s observation that broadband providers,
which often also operate cable television and telephone services, do have
an incentive to block or otherwise interfere with third-party Internet
services that could compete with them in those other arenas.86 Likewise,
ISPs have incentives to accept fees from content providers for either
granting them prioritized access to end users or for blocking other
competing content providers, and Verizon did not contest that it had the
technical and economic ability to carry out such blocking and
discrimination.87 Finally, the court recognized that because end users
typically receive broadband from a single provider, that provider “functions
as a terminating monopolist with power to act as a ‘gatekeeper’ to [content]
providers.”88 While this does leave consumers with the option of merely
switching broadband providers, they may be reluctant to do so given high
switching costs or other considerations.89 Moreover, the majority found
that the number of providers to which a dissatisfied consumer may switch
is extremely limited in most parts of the country.90
Verizon’s final contention as to the public policy wisdom of these
regulations was that any benefit they give to content provider innovation
and consequential demand for broadband infrastructure would “be
outweighed by the diminished incentives” broadband providers would have
to invest in infrastructure as result of the limitation in business models ISPs
may use.91 The court decided that there was insufficient information to
settle the regulatory issue, and thus it was up to the Commission to exercise
its judgment based on the available information to make a policy
conclusion.92 The court found that the Commission had offered a rational

83. Id. at 641.
84. Id. at 642-44 (explaining the court did not believe the regulations strayed too far beyond
the “paradigm case” likely contemplated by Congress when it supposedly granted such authority).
85. Id. at 645.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 645–46.
88. Id. at 646.
89. Id. at 646–47.
90. Id. at 647.
91. Id. at 649.
92. Id.
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connection between the available facts and the choice made and
accordingly deferred to the Commission’s judgment.93 In summary, the
court found that the Commission not only had the authority to regulate in
this arena, but also that the regulations themselves were reasonably tailored
to meet the statutory objective of promoting broadband deployment and
removing barriers to infrastructure innovation.
B. The Common Carrier Problem

Although the opinion thus far had been highly favorable and
deferential to the Commission, this would change when the court addressed
the common carrier classification issue. In the court’s view, regulating
broadband and mobile Internet providers as common carriers clearly
violated the Communications Act, given that the Commission was bound
by its own classification of broadband providers as “information services”
rather than common carrier telecommunications services.94 Yet, as Verizon
contended, by subjecting broadband providers to anti-blocking and antidiscrimination requirements, the Commission was nevertheless treating
broadband providers with the same standard of regulation they would have
received if the Commission had classified them as common carriers in the
first place.95
After examining the history of what the term “common carrier”
actually meant, the court considered the Commission’s explanation of how
the regulations were not, in fact, treating broadband providers as common
carriers.96 The Commission’s primary reasoning was that with respect to
content providers, broadband ISPs were not “carriers” at all because the
customers at issue were the end users, not the content providers.97 Under
the Commission’s theory, because broadband ISPs could still make
individualized decisions in determining the terms of a subscriber’s Internet
service under the Order, the broadband providers were not engaged in
common carriage.98 In other words, the Commission’s view was that if the
Commission did not restrict broadband ISPs’ ability to deal on
individualized terms with their subscribers, the Commission was not
regulating the ISPs as common carriers.99 The court disagreed.100
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id.
Id. at 650.
Id.
Id. at 651.
Id. at 653.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Rather, the court relied on an earlier Supreme Court decision, Midwest
Video II.101 Like the broadband providers’ customers in the case at bar, the
cable operators’ primary customers in Midwest Video II were subscribers,
and like broadband providers under the Open Internet Order, the cable
operators were obligated to carry third-party content to customers that the
cable operators otherwise would have been permitted to block.102 Given
these similarities, it appeared that broadband providers were being treated
as common carriers; a rose by any other name is, of course, still a rose.103
Failing in this argument, the Commission offered little else to justify its
treatment of such providers as common carriers.104
In summation, because the majority determined that the Open Internet
Order’s treatment of broadband providers in terms of the antidiscrimination and anti-blocking requirements relegated the providers to
common carrier status pro tanto, those requirements were vacated. At the
same time, the disclosure provision was upheld because it did not impose
common carrier obligations on the providers and the provision was
severable. The majority left open the possibility that the Commission
could modify the regulations in a permissible way to preserve the status
quo of net neutrality. In contrast, Senior Circuit Judge Silberman wrote a
separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, whereby he
acknowledged that the Open Internet Order’s treatment of broadband
providers as common carriers was impermissible, yet took the majority’s
opinion a step further by averring that the F.C.C. had no authority to
impose such regulations on broadband providers at all under Section 706
and the A.P.A.105
C. Judge Silberman’s Dissent

Judge Silberman concurred with the majority in many respects, such
as concluding that Section 706 is a positive grant of regulatory authority.106
Likewise, Silberman agreed with the majority that Chevron deference to
the Commission’s interpretation of the statutory language was warranted,
101. 440 U.S. 689 (1979) (dealing with whether cable operators should be treated as
common carriers).
102. Verizon, 740 F.3d at 654.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 655. Interestingly, the Commission never made any attempt to differentiate the
Order’s prohibition on unreasonable discrimination from the nondiscrimination standard, which,
by statute, applies to common carriers. Id. at 656. As a final inquiry, the court considered and
rejected Verizon’s argument that the disclosure requirements were not severable from the other,
stricken protections of Order. Id. at 659.
105. Id. (Silberman, J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 660.
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yet nonetheless opined, based on a dissection of Section 706’s language,
that the authority could not be stretched as far as it had been.107 Ultimately,
Silberman determined that the Commission’s treatment of broadband
providers was impermissible.108
Silberman concluded that the Section’s operative words granting
regulatory authority were that the Commission may implement “measures
that promote competition in the local telecommunications market or other
regulating methods that remove barriers to infrastructure investment.”109
Silberman accused both the Commission and the majority of conflating the
two clauses though they have distinct functions, with the former requiring
regulations that promote competition on price and quality among
telecommunications providers and the latter not bearing any such
requirement.110 Silberman’s view was that the Order must stand or fall on
the “removing barriers” clause, because, by the Commission’s own theory,
if it could spur demand for broadband the resulting increased investment in
infrastructure would occur irrespective of competition.111 Vitally, however,
the Commission had never once identified a specific practice of broadband
providers that could be considered a barrier to investment.112
Silberman argued that the regulation, resting on the “triple cushion
shot”113 theory, had not been designed to promote increased competition in
the broadband market, but rather had the stated objective of “protecting
consumer choice, free expression, end-user control, and the ability to
innovate without permission,” an objective that falls outside the scope of
Section 706’s statutory authority.114 Silberman’s main critique of the
majority’s opinion was that it was predicated on the idea that an open
Internet would spur demand for broadband infrastructure.115
Yet,
Silberman observed “any regulation that, in the FCC’s judgment might
arguably make the Internet ‘better,’ could increase demand.”116 To
Silberman’s mind, the majority’s reading of the statute would essentially

107. Id. (“Chevron is not a wand by which courts can turn an unlawful frog into a legitimate
prince.”) (quoting Assoc. Gas Distrib. v. F.E.R.C., 824 F.2d 981, 1001 (D.C. Cir. 1987)) (internal
quotations omitted).
108. Verizon, 740 F.3d at 667.
109. Id. at 660 (emphasis supplied).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 660–661.
112. Id. at 661.
113. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
114. Verizon, 740 F.3d at 661–662.
115. Id. at 662.
116. Id.
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“free the Commission of its congressional tether” by being overbroad
because almost any regulation could be interpreted to advance the statutory
requirement that regulations must encourage broadband deployment, thus
making the requirement illusory.117
Silberman’s dissent next turned to the assertion that, even assuming
valid authority, the Order was arbitrary and capricious in light of the fact
that the Commission’s findings were not supported by substantial
evidence.118 Contrary to the majority, Silberman did not believe the
Commission had ever made any legitimate finding that broadband
providers would or even could (technologically and economically) engage
in discrimination and blocking of content providers were it not for the open
Internet requirements.119 To illustrate this, Silberman stated that the
Commission’s proffered evidence consisted primarily of “may” and
“might” conclusory statements speculating how Internet providers would
behave in the absence of net neutrality.120 Silberman concluded that the
“triple cushion shot” theory rests on a faulty factual premise—that
broadband providers have the economic clout to profitably engage in such
discrimination and blocking as “gatekeepers” to end consumers.121
Silberman’s view was that a consumer dissatisfied with degraded Internet
service could simply switch to another provider with relative ease.122
While the Commission asserted why such switching would be
difficult, Silberman posited that such a rationale implies that broadband
providers have market power in the industry, without actually examining
whether they do.123 The Commission pointed to only four possible
instances of blocking and discrimination conduct.124 Silberman concluded
that “the Commission’s failure to conduct a market power analysis [was]
fatal to its attempt to regulate, because it [meant] that there [was]
inadequate evidence to support the lynchpin of the Commission’s economic
theory.”125 Likewise, the Commission had not alleged that broadband
117. Id. The majority claimed there was a limitation via the Commission’s subject matter
jurisdiction, yet Silberman dismissed this too as being an illusory restriction. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 663.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 664.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 664–65.
125. Id. at 665. Such an inquiry would necessitate a delineation of both the product and
geographic markets in which the broadband provider is competing before making a determination
that the market is concentrated. Id. A determination of the product market would not necessarily
be limited to those companies that provide “broadband” as it is defined by the Commission;
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providers were dividing territory and avoiding head-to-head competition; in
some areas the opposite seemed to be true.126 Lastly, Silberman noted that
the Justice Department had previously warned the Commission that unless
the Commission focused its regulations on market power, any regulation
might actually discourage broadband development.127

V. The Domino Effect of a Legally-Defensible Decision
The questions Verizon v. F.C.C. raised concern issues from
administrative stare decisis to statutory authority, antitrust market power
analysis, and, most importantly, overall public policy. While the judges in
this case interpreted the letter of the law correctly (or at least reasonably), it
is far more significant that the public is left to wonder how a lack of net
neutrality may impact the Internet provider industry and its now potentially
vulnerable consumers in the years to come.
This section first addresses the concurrence in the opinion as to the
Commission’s impermissible treatment of broadband providers as common
carriers. Next, this section analyzes the disagreement between the majority
and dissent as to whether the Commission had affirmative statutory
authority to implement the Open Internet Order. Later, this section
addresses whether a net neutrality regime is in the best interests of
consumers and the market as a whole. As a final matter, this section
speculates on the likely outcome of the Verizon decision and the
Commission’s—and broadband providers’—likely next move.
A. Stare Decisis and the Common Carrier Commonality
As an almost perfunctory matter, it bears mentioning that the
conclusion that the Order was invalid as a technical matter was reasonable.
Both the majority and Judge Silberman concluded that the Commission’s
treatment of broadband providers as common carriers—after it had already
made the determination that such providers were not common carriers—
was impermissible.128 The majority’s opinion explains that the statutory
substitute products such as slower Internet service and mobile Internet service would have to be
included because the products affect a broadband provider’s ability to raise prices. Id.
126. Id. at 666.
127. Id. Judge Silberman also raised the argument that the Order granted an economic
preference providing protection from market forces to a powerful group of constituents: Internet
content providers. Id. at 668. Section 706 requires the Commission to identify an actual threat to
competition or barrier to infrastructure investment, supported by evidence that such a threat or
barrier exists, and if such a requirement was not met, the Commission lacked the authority to
promulgate the regulation in the first place. Id. at 667–68. This theory was moot, however,
because Silberman agreed that the Order was invalid on other grounds. Id. at 667.
128. Id. at 650, 667.
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definition stipulates that a telecommunications carrier may be treated as a
common carrier only to the extent that it is providing “telecommunications
services.”129 This was problematic, given that the Commission previously
determined130 that broadband carriers are instead providing information
services.131 The terms of the Order prevent disparate treatment of traffic in
substantially the same way that common carriers are prevented from
discrimination in rendering service.132 Therefore, even though the
Commission never expressly stated it was attempting to treat broadband
ISPs as common carriers, it becomes clear that the Order represents a de
facto violation of the nexus of the statutory and administrative definitions
involved because it treats broadband providers as common carriers by
necessary implication.133
The court’s opinion never once uses the terms “stare decisis” or
“estoppel,” but those are the legal principles being employed. While the
Commission is not necessarily bound by its own decisions as a matter of
stare decisis,134 the Commission is bound to abide by its own definitions
that are still in effect, which means that imposing common carrier
obligations in broadband providers was unwarranted.135 An agency may
not simply disregard rules or categorical delineations that are still on the
books.136
The principle that the Commission could change its policy to define
broadband providers as telecommunications providers, subject to the
constraints of the A.P.A. and the “arbitrary and capricious” standard, was
also discussed at length in the opinion in relation to the change of
interpretation of the Commission’s own statutory authority when it
implemented the Order.137 The Commission would merely need to
acknowledge and explain the reasons for reclassifying ISPs as
telecommunications services.138 One motivation the Commission may

129. Id. at 650; see also 47 U.S.C.A. § 153(51) (2012).
130. See In re Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet Over Wireline
Facilities, 20 F.C.C.R. 14853, 14862 ¶ 12 (2005).
131. Verizon, 740 F.3d at 650–58.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. See generally Honeywell Int’l., Inc. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 628 F.3d 568
(D.C. Cir. 2010).
135. Verizon, 740 F.3d at 650–58.
136. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (1966); see also NetCoalition v. S.E.C., 615 F.3d 525, 536 (D.C. Cir.
2010).
137. Verizon, 740 F.3d at 635–36.
138. Id. at 636.
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have had to avoid such a reclassification was that it had previously faced
opposition to the proposal of reclassifying broadband providers as common
carriers.139 Besides industry opposition to common carrier regulation,
forty-eight members of Congress had requested that the Commission leave
any such change in policy to the legislature in a 2010 congressional
resolution.140
By declining to officially reclassify broadband providers as common
carriers, yet nevertheless treating them as such, the Commission found an
inconspicuous way to treat ISPs as it desired without inviting the
immediate ire that an outright reclassification would bring. It is clear from
the reasons outlined in the Verizon opinion that this arguably somewhat
devious approach to regulation was invalid.141 The better question is
whether the Commission had the authority to impose antidiscrimination
and anti-blocking rules in the first place, a matter over which the majority
and Judge Silberman disagreed.142
B. Affirmative Statutory Authority and the Antitrust Antithesis
It seems fairly clear that Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act
did make an implicit grant of statutory authority to the Commission to
regulate within this arena.143 It is also not contested that the granted
statutory authority has limitations, although the majority’s explanation of
the extent of those limitations is somewhat unsatisfactory.144 Saying that
the Commission is limited to its subject matter jurisdiction and that any
regulation must encourage deployment of advanced telecommunications
ability is indeed no limitation at all other than an illusory one.145 The
Commission could shoehorn just about any telecommunications regulation
into this jurisdictional scope. This is not entirely a bad thing, however,
since the Commission is the appointed expert on the Internet and therefore
is better equipped to make nuanced decisions about its regulation than is
Congress.
An alternative argument would be that although the
Commission may have stretched the scope of its authority too far, the real

139. H.R. Con. Res. 311, 111th Cong., 2d Sess. (July 30, 2010)..
140. John Eggerton, 48 Members of Congress Tell FCC To Back Off Broadband Action (July
30, 2010, 5:35 PM), available at http://www.broadcastingcable.com/news/washington/48members-congress-tell-fcc-back-broadband-action/57788.
141. See Verizon, 740 F.3d at 650–658.
142. See id. at 660–667 (Silberman, J., dissenting).
143. See id. at 638 (majority opinion).
144. Id. at 662 (Silberman, J., dissenting).
145. See id.
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problem is that the Commission was simply not given enough authority to
regulate effectively.
A key component of the dissent’s counterargument in this case was
that the Commission may have overstepped its limited authority in the
Open Internet Order because the regulation was arguably made without the
validation of substantial evidence that there were significant barriers to
infrastructure investment, thus rendering the regulation “arbitrary and
capricious.”146 As to the lack of supporting evidence of any real problem
supporting the Order’s provisions, Judge Silberman remarks in his dissent
that the Commission never once identified any current practice of
broadband providers that was an actual barrier to investment.147 The
Commission did purport to show that, absent regulation, barriers to
infrastructure and market failures might result, however.148 For example,
the Commission stated that a broadband provider:
may have economic incentives to block or otherwise
disadvantage specific edge providers[,]
might use this power to benefit its own or affiliated
offerings at the expense of unaffiliated offerings[,]
may act to benefit edge providers that have paid it to
exclude rivals[,]
may have incentives to increase revenues by charging
edge providers[, and]
might withhold or decline to expand capacity in order
to ‘squeeze’ non-prioritized traffic[.]149
As the dissent was quick to point out, these all amount to speculation,
rather than actual evidence.150 Although these certainly represent valid
concerns, it may be true that the evidence was too anemic to support such a
sweeping regulation based on the current statutory authority allotted to the
Commission.151 Specifically, if Internet providers do in fact have the
“technical and economic” ability to impose restrictions on content

146. See generally Hon. Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Net Neutrality vs. Net Reality: Why An
Evidence-Based Approach to Enforcement, and Not More Regulation, Could Protect Innovation
on the Internet, 14 ENGAGE: J. FEDERALIST SOC’Y PRAC. GROUPS 81 (2013).
147. Verizon, 740 F.3d at 661 (Silberman, J., dissenting).
148. Id. at 663.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. See Thomas W. Hazlett & Joshua D. Wright, The Law and Economics of Network
Neutrality, 45 IND. L. REV. 767, 811–16 (2012).
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providers—the lynchpin of the Commission’s theory—why had they not
done so before the Order’s implementation?152
Surely broadband providers do have some incentives to engage in
blocking and discrimination.153 One reason they may decline to do so is
because of a lack of economic clout or market power. This raises questions
of antitrust, a body of law that often finds itself intertwined and
occasionally adverse to administrative regulation.154 Judge Silberman
argued that because the Commission had not conducted a market power
analysis prior to implementing the Order, its findings were invalid.155 The
Commission and majority both declared that ISPs represent a “terminating
monopoly” over Internet content because Internet users tend to access the
Internet via just one fixed provider.156 The content thus becomes
inaccessible to them entirely when the ISP decides to act as a gatekeeper of
specific content.157 The extent to which this represents actual market
power depends upon the availability of other local providers, however.158
In the earlier years of the Internet, the last-mile service of the Internet
was something of a “natural monopoly” like that of public utility
companies, but today it is more common for consumers to have options
among ISPs, at least in nonrural areas.159 Whereas the majority followed
the Commission’s belief that consumers are unlikely to respond to
discrimination and blocking of content by switching ISPs,160 the dissent
broadly criticized this conclusion on the grounds that switching would only

152. See generally id. (providing a thorough analysis of this question).
153. See infra Part V(C).
154. See generally Babette E. L. Boliek, FCC Regulation versus Antitrust: How Net
Neutrality Is Defining the Boundaries, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1627, 1629 (2011). The authority to
regulate and enforce antitrust threats granted to the Federal Trade Commission and the
Department of Justice does alleviate the F.C.C. from bearing the sole responsibility for ensuring
that a lack of net neutrality does not result in some sort of catastrophic market failure. See id. at
1628.
155. Verizon, 740 F.3d at 665. That said, the Commission is not the expert in ascertaining
what constitutes impermissible market power, and therefore any antitrust-focused attempt at
regulation might encroach on the authority of the Federal Trade Commission. Id.
156. Many, if not most, users access the Internet via both a single wireline broadband
provider and over a separate mobile provider on smartphones. Still, some content, such as
Netflix, is more valuably used via wired broadband.
157. Verizon, 740 F.3d at 646.
158. See id. (“If end users could immediately respond to any given broadband provider’s
attempt to impose restrictions on edge providers by switching broadband providers, this
gatekeeper power might well disappear.”).
159. See id. at 666.
160. Id.
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be difficult if the ISPs had real market power.161 The majority’s assertion
that consumers would not switch providers because they would be unaware
of such blocking or discrimination is somewhat dubious, at least as to
major content providers like Netflix, Sykpe, Google, and Facebook.162
Surely, in the case of one of those giants, any such degradation or blocking
would sooner or later be covered by the media, and as a result, consumers
could easily find out if a service had been blocked as opposed to, say,
having been shut down. This is less true as to smaller content providers,
the degradation or blocking of which would be more likely to go unnoticed.
Yet because the portion of the Order that requires disclosure of network
management practices remains intact, an ISP’s blocking of content could
never truly be secret—just inconspicuous.163
At the same time, Judge Silberman makes an equally dubious
argument when he implies that consumers would have an easy time
switching between providers, thus rendering market power and
concentration weak.164 This ignores the reality that in many areas
consumers’ choices of full-fledged broadband service are quite limited.165
One recent F.C.C. study in 2010 found that “approximately 96% of the
population has [access to] at most two wireline providers” of Internet
service.166 And while—given the increasing coverage and quality of
mobile high-speed Internet—this may be based on a faulty definition of the
relevant product market that is arguably too narrow, it is an alarming reality
nonetheless. Taken to its most extreme, there are some Americans who
have only one option for wired Internet, period. For example, citizens of
America’s Pacific island territory of Saipan, CNMI, have only one Internet
provider and have suffered monopolistic pricing issues as a result, a clear
161. Id. at 664.
162. See accord, Andrew Orlowski, Almost everyone read the Verizon v. FCC net neutrality
verdict WRONG, THE REGISTER (Jan. 18, 2014), http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/
01/18/why_almost_everyone_got_the_net_neutrality_verdict_wrong/.
163. Anyone motivated enough to seek it out this information could conclusively determine
whether a content provider was, in fact, being blocked or degraded.
164. See Verizon, 740 F.3d at 663–64 (Silberman, J., dissenting).
165. Id. at 665. Silberman’s view that slower Internet providers and mobile providers reduce
broadband providers’ market power has some flaws as well, dependent on what the specific
consumer plans to do with his or her Internet connection. For example, if the consumer’s sole
reason for wanting wired Internet access is to engage in online gaming on networks such as Xbox
Live, either substitute service provides no value, and thus does not affect the fixed-line broadband
provider’s ability to raise prices or tamper with price structures.
166. Connecting America.: The Nat’l Broadband Plan, 2010 WL 972375 (F.C.C. Mar. 16,
2010). The Commission cited a 2009 statistic that seventy percent of households were in areas
where only one or two broadband providers were available when it defended its implementation
of the Order as being supported by evidence. Verizon, 740 F.3d at 665.
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indication of market power.167 Anywhere an Internet provider can flex its
market power in this way is an area in which a provider could also censor
content without economic backlash. In any case, even Americans who live
in areas not quite as remote suffer from a limited number of providers: If
only two fixed broadband providers are available168 and they both
independently or collusively decide to block and degrade certain content,
the effect is exactly the same. Similarly, consumers could also face
barriers to exit in the form of early termination fees from their old provider
and initial connection fees from any new provider, either of which might
serve to deter switching.
In summation, Judge Silberman’s objection to the Commission’s
failure to establish the market power of broadband providers is a valid one.
However, because the market for broadband Internet service is highly
concentrated for many consumers, the Order addressed a legitimate
concern. In other words, even though the Commission may have exceeded
its authority with the Order, or at the very least did not implement it
properly with prior-established evidence, the Order’s mandate of net
neutrality may yet be sound because it addresses a number of potential
market failures.
C. Problematic Public Policy?
Looking at the technical and textual statutory authority and stare
decisis issues at hand, the court’s decision in this case seems wholly
proper. Regardless of the wisdom of the regulation, it was the court’s task
to affirm or vacate the Order based on its legal validity.169 That said, the
court’s opinion does little to address the far more compelling question at
hand: whether net neutrality is good public policy. Throughout its young
existence, the Internet has proved to be an admirably level playing field
where small start-ups often supplant established players (i.e., Facebook
replacing MySpace). In a regulatory scheme that allows for paid
prioritization, start-ups—and particularly bandwidth-intensive start-ups—
will likely find themselves unable to put forth the capital necessary to
167. Telephone Interview with Ghassan Harb, Consumer Counsel at the Att’y Gen.’s Off. of
the Commonwealth of the N. Mar. I. (Feb. 24, 2014). As an aside, this and other U.S. island
territories such as American Samoa are areas where telecommunications infrastructure investment
is currently severely lacking. Michael Calabrese et. al., The Most Expensive Internet in America,
SLATE: FUTURE TENSE (May 24, 2012), http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2012/05/24/
internet_access_and_cost_in_american_samoa_northern_marianas_islands_guam_.html.
168. The presence of mobile broadband changes the market power analysis to mean such a
scenario is not quite a duopoly, yet there are still services for which mobile broadband access is
ineffective. See supra note 165.
169. Verizon, 740 F.3d at 634–35.
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obtain a level of service similar to that of established competitors and
therefore may never get off the ground.
Content providers are concerned that in the absence of an open
Internet their content will be blocked or degraded, that it will encourage
ISPs to further vertically integrate into content and applications, and that it
will contribute to the diminution of free speech on the Internet.170 At the
heart of this debate is that ISPs essentially want a “piece of the pie” from
any content provider making money on the Internet via the ISP’s
network.171 If cable companies can charge video aggregators like Netflix,
YouTube, and Hulu, or communications providers like Skype, a fee in
order to avoid being blocked or degraded (a sort of now-legal extortion),
those companies will respond by passing along costs to the consumer or
inserting even more advertisements than they already do.172
Netflix publicizes the performance speeds it receives from various
broadband providers, and upon examination the graphical data does seem
to indicate that the streaming service is being forced via degraded service
into making special paid arrangements with ISPs.173 To be fair, streaming
video providers comprise some of the most expensive content for
broadband providers to carry because they are invariably bandwidth
intensive. Netflix alone was reported to account for roughly thirty percent
of downstream Internet traffic.174 Likewise, if broadband providers
continue to be forced to abide by open Internet practices, they might simply
begin charging more for their own services, meaning that added costs
arising out of the increasingly bandwidth-intensive ways in which the
average consumer uses the Internet are somewhat unavoidable.175 Still,
there are other, more worrying, potential market failures here.

170. Ohlhausen, supra note 146 at 81.
171. Colbert Report: Interview with Tim Wu (Comedy Central television broadcast Jan. 23,
2014), available at http://www.colbertnation.com/the-colbert-report-videos/432449/january-232014/end-of-net-neutrality—-tim-wu.
172. See id.
173. Last Week Tonight with John Oliver, Ep. 5: Net Neutrality (HBO broadcast June 1,
2014), available at http://www.hbo.com/last-week-tonight-with-john-oliver/episodes/01/5-june-12014/video/net-neutrality.html#/ (“[The cable company’s treatment of Netflix] has all the
ingredients of a mob shake-down.”).
174. Tracey Lien, Why a Deal Between Netflix and Comcast Matters to Gamers, POLYGON
(Mar. 13, 2014, 9:30 AM), http://www.polygon.com/2014/3/13/5483184/why-a-deal-betweennetflix-and-comcast-matters-to-gamers.
175. See Gary Kim, Globally, Bandwidth Consumption Continues to Double Every Two
Years, TECHZONE360 http://www.techzone360.com/topics/techzone/articles/2012/07/18/
299247-globally-bandwidth-consumption-continues-double-every-two-years.htm (July 18, 2012)
(explaining global bandwidth demand roughly doubles every two years).
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Some commentators have argued that cable companies in particular
may have a more nefarious reason to want to degrade or block content, and
especially video streaming content: eliminating competition. In many ways
video aggregators like Netflix and Hulu Plus are formidable rivals to cable
companies.176 An increasing number of Americans have switched off
cable, finding entertainment in online video sources instead.177 Hulu in
particular, a joint venture of three of the major broadcast television
networks,178 could be perceived as a threat because it offers much of the
same content people pay to view on cable with the added convenience of
being on demand and usually available the morning after a show airs.179
Likewise, many cable providers offer their own on-demand video services,
sometimes for a fee.180 Moreover, some cable companies already pay
additional fees to cable networks to ensure that only cable subscribers can
view certain content on those networks’ websites,181 indicating a
willingness to cut deals with video content providers. That said, while it is
one thing to say that cable companies providing broadband could block or
degrade competing video aggregators and other sources of streaming video,
it is another thing to say that they actually would, given market pressures
and the potential that gains from blocking might be offset by losses in
demand for the provider’s Internet service.182

176. Aaron Taube, Proof That Netflix is Destroying Cable TV, YAHOO FINANCE (Apr. 16,
2014, 7:07 PM), https://finance.yahoo.com/news/proof-netflix-destroying-cable-tv-000400548.
html (noting subscribers to Netflix and Hulu Plus were reported to be three times as likely to not
have a cable subscription).
177. Richard Davies, More Consumers Cut the Cable Cord, ABC NEWS (Mar. 20, 2014,
9:01 AM), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/business/2014/03/more-consumers-cut-the-cable-cord/
(stating that 2013 marked the first year ever that pay-TV operators reported an annual decline in
the number of subscribers, indicative of the consumer trend of “cord cutting”).
178. These are NBC Universal, News Corp. (Fox), and Walt Disney Co. (ABC). See Boliek,
supra note 154 at n. 248.
179. Associated Press, Hulu names Fox exec as CEO, NEW YORK POST (Oct. 17, 2013,
10:04 PM), http://nypost.com/2013/10/17/hulu-names-fox-exec-as-ceo/.
180. One such example is Xfinity Streampix, a paid service offered by Comcast that is meant
to compete with Netflix, Amazon Instant Video, and Hulu. Trefis Team, The Latest Deal With
Sony Pictures Highlights Comcast’s Efforts To Push Its On-Demand and Streaming Services,
FORBES (Mar. 3, 2014, 1:47 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2014/03/12/thelatest-deal-with-sony-pictures-highlights-comcasts-efforts-to-push-its-on-demand-and-streamingservices/.
181. Dorothy Pomerantz, ESPN Tries To Have It Both Ways, FORBES (Jan. 27, 2014, 4:43
PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/dorothypomerantz/2014/01/27/espn-tries-to-have-it-both-ways/.
182. See Boliek, supra note 154, at n. 243. It is also worth noting that if blocking did induce
people to unsubscribe from a cable company’s Internet service, it could also induce them to
switch television providers at the same time, resulting in further losses.
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The same possible market failure exists with cable and DSL
broadband providers vis-à-vis an alternative communications service like
Skype, which competes with traditional phone services typically provided
by those same companies. Given that the residential landline telephone is
falling into near irrelevance,183 however, this is a somewhat petty concern.
A more compelling concern would be about how mobile broadband
providers might want to block Skype because its voice and video service
competes with the original use of the cellular telephone. The evidence
would suggest that on the contrary, mobile carriers have embraced Skype,
however.184
The anticompetitive argument proposed by net neutrality advocates,
which is not without its faults,185 may be magnified when it comes to one
broadband provider in particular: Comcast. The company recently
vertically integrated to acquire NBC Universal (owner of NBC and a host
of cable networks) from General Electric and thus faces competition from
streaming video available online in more ways than usual.186 Net neutrality
was, not surprisingly, a key inquiry in the F.C.C.’s review and eventual
approval of that acquisition.187 Additionally, Comcast later made a bid to
acquire Time Warner Cable, which could make the company the broadband
provider for roughly one third of American households.188 Comcast is a
powerful player not just in the market, but politically too; the company
spent an astonishing $18,810,000 on lobbying during 2013.189 This would
seem to make Comcast a particularly frightening potential abuser of market
power. However, under a consent decree related to its acquisition of NBC

183. Just 71% of households had a landline telephone in 2011, a number that has likely
declined further since then while cell phone ownership has soared and does not speak to how
much those landlines are actually used. Jeffrey Sparshott, More People Say Goodbye to Their
Landlines, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 5, 2013, 7:32 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001
424127887323893004579057402031104502.
184. See Ryan Singel, Verizon Embraces Skype on Smartphones, WIRED (Feb. 16, 2010,
1:36 PM), http://www.wired.com/2010/02/verizon-embraces-skype-on-smart-phones/.
185. Indeed, there is a fairly cogent argument that the ex post “wait and see” approach of
antitrust law is a far more efficient market control measure than is ex ante regulation, because
regulation runs the risk of forbidding not just anti-competitive but also pro-competitive practices
and may stifle innovation. Boliek, supra note 154, at 1681–82.
186. In the Matter of Applications of Comcast Corp., Gen. Elec. Co. & NBC Universal, Inc.,
26 F.C.C. Rec. 4238, 4352-53 (2011).
187. Id. at 4351.
188. Dawn C. Chmielewski, Comcast-Time Warner Cable deal may heighten calls for net
neutrality, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 13, 2014, 4:42 PM), http://articles.latimes.com/2014/feb/13/
entertainment/la-et-ct-comcast-merger-net-neutrality-20140213.
189. Robert Reich, Antitrust in the New Gilded Age, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 17, 2014, 9:20
AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-reich/comcast-time-warner_b_5166292.html.
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Universal, Comcast agreed to abide by net neutrality principles until 2017,
an agreement that remains in place even though the Open Internet Order
was struck down.190 So at least for the next few years, Comcast’s
subscribers (and Time Warner’s subscribers if the deal goes through) will
have their worries about the outcome of the Verizon case mitigated,
although the agreement has not stopped Comcast from entering a streaming
deal with Netflix.191
Although evidence of broadband providers actually blocking
competing content is somewhat scarce, for evidence that they might engage
in such practices if permitted one need look no further than the smartphone
application blocking that has been done by Verizon itself in the past. In
2012, Verizon accepted a $1.25 million settlement with the F.C.C. after it
impermissibly blocked various “tethering” applications that competed with
the carrier’s own mobile hotspot service.192 Likewise, cable networks and
cable providers are no stranger to arranging for a type of permissible
blocking of their own.193 Cable television networks have worked with
cable companies to ensure that the videos provided on many cable
channel’s websites and apps do not cannibalize one of their primary
revenue sources—the fees collected from cable providers to carry the
network. The networks do this by requiring online viewers to authenticate
that they have a cable subscription with a participating cable company
before they are allowed to watch.194
In the wake of its victory in Verizon v. F.C.C., Verizon publically
stated that it has been and remains committed to an open Internet and that
the court’s decision had not changed this.195 But if Verizon did not want to
operate outside the rules of net neutrality, why would it have bothered with
the trouble and expense of this lawsuit in the first place? Indeed, Verizon
expressly told the court in this proceeding that if it were not for the open
Internet rules, “[it] would be exploring . . . commercial arrangements [with

190. Id.
191. See infra notes 215-17 and accompanying text.
192. Peter Svenssen, Verizon Can’t Block Tethering Apps Says FCC; Carrier Pays to Settle
Probe, HUFFINGTON POST (July 31, 2012, 4:19 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/07/31/
verizon-cant-block-tethering-apps_n_1725466.html.
193. See, e.g., Dorothy Pomerantz, ESPN Tries to Have It Both Ways, FORBES (Jan. 27,
2014, 4:43 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/dorothypomerantz/2014/01/27/espn-tries-to-haveit-both-ways/.
194. Id. ESPN’s strategy is to charge cable companies that want their subscribers to have
access to its app an extra fee. Id. Note that ESPN is already the most expensive channel for cable
companies to carry. Id.
195. Edward Wyatt, Rebuffing F.C.C. in ‘Net Neutrality’ Case, Court Allows Streaming
Deals, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2014, at B1, available at http://nyti.ms/1cjrF1t.
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services like Netflix],”196 and it since has.197 Verizon claimed to the public
that it merely wanted to manage its network in the way it saw fit.198 In a
press release, Verizon further stated that the decision would allow
“broadband providers to offer new and innovative services to their
customers,” that it would allow “more room for innovation,” and that it
would keep the Internet “a of hub of innovation.” This prompted talk show
host Stephen Colbert to sarcastically quip, “See, net neutrality’s only been
dead a week, and already three innovative uses of the word
‘innovation.’”199 The innovation of which Verizon spoke presumably
means new billing practices, a shift that has the potential to spell bad news
for consumers.
Another possible shortfall of the new regulatory scheme, or lack
thereof, is that it could result in degradation beyond just those services that
involve streaming video. Although it is sheer speculation, the majority
theorized that an Internet provider could accept payment from content
rivals to degrade a competitor,200 e.g., degrading or blocking Bing if
Google paid it to do so. This concern becomes even more relevant in light
of the vertical integration that has already taken place in the industry.201
Google recently vertically integrated to make the foray into providing
Internet service via Google Fiber.202 On the one hand, the emergence of
Google as a provider softens cable and DSL broadband providers’ potential
market power.203 On the other hand, Google has incentive to degrade the
service of a competitor like Bing, or the competitor of any one of its
various services, like Google Plus and its thus-far inauspicious attempt to
compete with Facebook.204 Likewise, Comcast now owns NBC Universal

196. Id.
197. Several months later, Netflix begrudgingly agreed to a paid peering deal with Verizon.
Sam Gustin, Netflix Pays Verizon in Streaming Deal, Following Comcast Pact, TIME (Apr. 28,
2014), http://ti.me/1pHVPrT.
198. Id.
199. Stephen Colbert, End of Net Neutrality, COLBERT REPORT (Comedy Central broadcast
Jan. 23, 2014).
200. Verizon, 740 F.3d at 629.
201. See, e.g., Rick Busciglio, Comcast acquires 100 percent of NBC Universal,
Examiner.com (Feb. 13, 2013), http://www.examiner.com/article/comcast-acquires-100-percentof-nbc-universal.
202. Id.
203. See id.
204. See Daniel Sparks, Facebook Inc. Isn’t Overvalued: Here’s Why the Doubters Are
Wrong, THE MOTLEY FOOL (Apr. 3, 2014), http://www.fool.com/investing/general/2014/04/02/acloser-look-at-facebook-incs-greatest-competitiv.aspx.
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and therefore is also a part owner of MSNBC,205 and without net neutrality
it could, in theory, block or degrade the websites of competing firms such
as Fox News or CNN. At that point, the issue starts to evolve into one of
free speech and censorship.206 In any case, a lack of net neutrality
represents at best a “mixed bag” practice and at worst a potentially massive
market failure should the fears of net neutrality advocates actually come to
pass.
D. An Uncertain Future

Contrary to the expectations of many, the Commission ended up
deciding not to appeal the Verizon v. F.C.C. case to the Supreme Court.207
F.C.C. chairmen Tom Wheeler had previously said the Commission might
appeal the decision at the time it was released, although he may not have
ever planned to do so, given that he had previously voiced support for the
idea of allowing Internet providers to experiment with new business
models.208 Wheeler, a former telecommunications industry insider, said at
the time that the Commission would be developing new rules to replace the
Order.209 The Commission did later propose a new set of net neutrality
regulations several months later in May 2014, albeit a fairly anemic set that
allowed for so-called “Internet fast lanes” where content providers could
pay ISPs for preferential treatment.210
The post net neutrality marketplace is still very much nascent, but
some evidence of newly-permitted practices by ISPs have already emerged.
Comcast recently inked a deal with Netflix to allow faster, smoother
streaming.211 Netflix had previously complained that streaming speeds on
Comcast were starting to lag behind those on other ISPs, sparking
205. Mike Segar, Comcast buys Microsoft stake in MSNBC.com, REUTERS (July 16, 2012),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/16/us-msnbc-microsoft-idUSBRE86F04W20120716.
206. If successful, a merger of Comcast and Time Warner would yield a disturbing amount
of influence over speech coming from movie studios, television producers, and news
organizations, given that all those industries would have to rely on the combined organization to
get their messages to the general public. Reich, supra note 189.
207. James P. Tuthill, FCC throws in the towel, but public has right to know why, SFGATE
(Feb. 25, 2014), http://www.sfgate.com/default/article/FCC-throws-in-the-towel-but-public-hasright-to-5267613.php.
208. Edward Wyatt, Rebuffing F.C.C. in ‘Net Neutrality’ Case, Court Allows Streaming
Deals, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2014, at B1, available at http://nyti.ms/1cjrF1t. This represents a
shift from Wheeler’s predecessor, who implemented the Open Internet Order. Id.
209. Tuthill, supra note 207.
210. See Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet NPRM, FCC 14-61 (2014 (available at
http://www.fcc.gov/document/protecting-and-promoting-open-internet-nprm (last visited Oct. 26, 2014)).
211. Chloe Albanesius, Comcast, Netflix Ink Deal to Improve Streaming Speeds, PC
MAGAZINE (Feb. 23, 2014), http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2453878,00.asp.
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accusations that Comcast was deliberately stifling Netflix traffic to extort
payment from the video aggregator.212 The deal requires Netflix to pay for
use of Comcast’s network and presumably allows Comcast subscribers to
view Netflix’s new Ultra High Definition content, a service that Netflix so
far has only provided to ISPs that participate in its Open Connect
Network.213 That network allows Netflix to connect directly to ISPs or
embed its content servers inside an ISP’s network, thus eliminating
middleman backbone networks.214 Comcast has said that Netflix will still
not receive preferential network treatment, as doing so would violate its
consent decree,215 but the arrangement and others like it—such as the one
recently inked by Verizon216—are nonetheless suspect.217

VI. Conclusion
It is certainly rare for a Circuit Court case over an administrative order
within the telecommunications industry to invoke such strong feelings on
either side of the debate,218 yet Verizon v. F.C.C. is no ordinary case
because net neutrality is no ordinary issue.219 The ways in which this
decision could spell bad news for consumers are myriad. Content
providers may start paying fees for preferred service, which in turn would
result in higher costs for those services passed on to the consumer.
Furthermore, net neutrality previously allowed anyone to become a content
producer by leveling the playing field, which is pivotal to ensuring
innovative newcomers are not boxed out by established content providers

212. See Lien, supra note 174.
213. Albanesius, supra note 211.
214. Id.
215. See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
216. See Gustin, supra note 197.
217. Lien, supra note 174 (“Netflix is conceding they have to do this, that they cannot
survive as an Internet content provider without paying the cable companies a fee.”).
218. Indeed, talk show host John Oliver made light of the disinterest most people have for
things like the minutiae of F.C.C. regulations when he did a segment on his show about net
neutrality and its recent shake-up, theorizing that net neutrality’s esoteric nature had shielded it
from greater public outcry. Last Week Tonight with John Oliver, Ep. 5: Net Neutrality (HBO
broadcast June 1, 2014), available at http://www.hbo.com/last-week-tonight-with-johnoliver/episodes/01/5-june-1-2014/video/net-neutrality.html#/ (“The cable companies have figured
out the great truth of America: If you want to do something evil, put it inside something boring.”).
219. It would seem that the public, once educated on the issue, is quite opinionated about Net
Neutrality and the F.C.C.’s new proposed rules. The Commission received over a million comments to
its proposed rules, a record number and a volume so high it caused the F.C.C.’s website to crash. See
Elise Hu, One Million Net Neutrality Comments Filed, but Will They Matter?, National Public Radio,
http://www.npr.org/blogs/alltechconsidered/2014/07/21/332678802/one-million-netneutralitycomments-filed-but-will-they-matter (last accessed Oct. 26, 2014).
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who see them as a threat. Simply put, the Internet was not broken before,
and yet it may be now.
At the same time, despite the sensationalist speech on this issue being
disseminated to the public,220 one must be careful not to overreact. It may
be that many of those notions of a dystopian future for cyberspace are
unlikely to come to pass in most areas due to normal market pressures and
the still-present and potent force that is federal antitrust law. Indeed,
prophylactic authority in this arena is actually somewhat dispersed: the
protections put in place by the F.T.C. and Department of Justice that guard
against market failures are unaffected by this decision, meaning the market
is not completely vulnerable. Perhaps this window of opportunity for
broadband providers to experiment with “innovative” business models—
which will be open at least until the Commission approves a new set of
rules in accordance with the court’s decision—is a good thing because it
could partially settle the net neutrality debate. Conversely, if the
Commission ultimately fails to adopt another net neutrality regulation, this
interim period of free experimentation could become permanent, for better
or worse.
The seminal question is an age-old one that is raised whenever there is
a potential for market failures: whether the laissez-faire open market or
effective regulation is the means to an optimally efficient result. It may
very well be true, as some have posited, that addressing any market failures
from an absence of net neutrality is more efficiently left to the “wait and
see” approach of antitrust law than ex ante regulation.221 Moreover, one
may argue that it is inefficient and unavailing to attempt to closely regulate
such a rapidly changing industry where technological innovations routinely
alter the competitive landscape. Indeed, the Commission should be
cautious about forming regulations based on concerns of undue market
power because it is not the designated expert in that field.222 The answer to
the question of what solution is optimal will take time to flesh out if it is
ever reached at all. In the meantime, however, the future of the Internet—
which is itself a symbol and embodiment of the principles of future
progress, innovation, and competitive fair play—hangs in the balance.

220. This includes predictions of a populist revolt. See, e.g., Ron Fournier, Net Neutrality’s Death
Could Spark Populist Revolt, NATIONAL JOURNAL (May 6, 2014), available at
http://www.nationaljournal.com/tech/net-neutrality-s-death-could-spark-populist-revolt20140506?ocid=msnnws (suggesting Comcast or Verizon might be this generation’s Standard Oil).
221. See Boliek, supra note 154 at 1681–82.
222. See generally id.

